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Notes
1. Rep. Paul Ryan, The Path to Prosperity: Restoring Amer-
ica’s Fiscal Promise, Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Resolution,
House Committee on the Budget, 2011.
2. The White House, “Fact Sheet: The President’s Frame-
work for Shared Prosperity and Shared Fiscal Respon-
sibility,” press release, April 13, 2011.
3. The 10-year deficit savings estimate for the HBR plan
is from CRFB (2011a), and its estimated annual impact
by midcentury is from CBO (2011c), table 2. The
$320 billion in 10-year savings is the OMB estimate for
health care in the president’s plan; the authors have
estimated the midcentury annual impact of the same
on a basis consistent with the methodology used in
CBO (2011c), table 2.
4. Problems of adverse selection would be addressed by
cost-neutral (in the aggregate) risk subsidies and tax
levies applied by the Department of Health and Human
Services to the private insurance plans based on the
characteristics of their actual enrollees.
5. The White House, “President’s Framework,” April 13,
2011.
6. For example, CBO estimates that by 2030 the out-
of-pocket share of health care spending for a typical
Medicare beneficiary would be 68 percent under the
HBR, as opposed to 25 to 30 percent under current law
(CBO 2011c, figure 1).
7. For a brief discussion of how the HBR might be
improved upon written by an advocate of converting
Medicare to premium support, see Wilensky (2011).
For a brief criticism of the various versions of pre-
mium support currently in vogue by one of its initial
proponents, see Aaron (2011).
8. See the “Statement of Actuarial Opinion” by Richard
Foster in Board of Trustees (2011). Both this statement
and the body of the report note that the long-term via-
bility of these strictures would require fundamental
changes in the health care delivery system.
9. SCHIP provides health insurance coverage to un-
insured children living in families with low incomes
that have too much income to qualify for Medicaid.
As in Medicaid, the federal government matches state
spending in accordance with a formula. Unlike Med-
icaid, annual federal funding is set at a fixed level, and
each state receives an allotment based on an estimate
of the target population and the cost of providing
medical services there.
10. For a general discussion of a federal block grant for
Medicaid, see Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and
the Uninsured (2011).
11. The trustees had expected several years of near-term
annual cash flow surpluses for the program, but they
now expect continuous cash flow deficits because of
a downward revision in projected economic growth.
Several other factors, including an increase in
assumed life expectancy, have worsened the long-
term outlook.
12. Annual cash flow deficits are now projected to grow to
1.38 percent of GDP by the time program reserves are
depleted in 2036 and exceed 1.45 percent of GDP by
the end of the 75-year period (Board of Trustees, Fed-
eral Old Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Dis-
ability Insurance Trust Funds 2011).
13. White House, “President’s Framework,” April 13, 2011.
14. The CRFB estimate of 18 percent is based on slightly
different assumptions than the 19 percent long-run
cap implied by the HBR, but the difference is very
small (CRFB 2011b).
15. Caps can be increased for war spending, disaster
relief, other emergencies, and monies spent to reduce
improper benefit payments in several programs pro-
viding transfer payments. The law also requires that
the Congress vote on a balanced budget amendment
to the Constitution.
16. The estimate of interest saving is based on CBO’s inter-
est forecast of August 2011 and therefore differs from
the March 2011 baseline assumptions used in the first
part of this paper. See CBO (2011b).
17. For discretionary programs, budget authority is pro-
vided by appropriations that are most often passed
annually. For entitlements, budget authority is often
created by dedicated revenues, such as the payroll tax
that finances Part A Medicare.
18. Proportionate cuts are applied equally to every
defense and nondefense budget account in 2013. The
percentage cut is somewhat larger in defense than in
nondefense accounts. After 2013, cuts are not equal-
ized at the account level for discretionary spending.
Separate overall caps are established for defense and
nondefense budget authority.
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The new plan accepts the caps on discretionary spend-
ing stipulated by the BCA and counts the associated
spending cuts toward its saving target. The president
repeats the call for radical tax reform that appeared in
his earlier framework, but recognizing that tax reform
will take a long time, he advocates $1.5 trillion in rev-
enues by limiting itemized deductions and adopts other
base-broadening initiatives for both individuals and
corporations.
The new presidential plan has a somewhat different
enforcement mechanism than the framework. The latter
focused on sequesters that would hit a deficit goal. In 
the new plan, enforcement is centered around goals for
the debt-GDP ratio. To set goals, the baseline debt-GDP
ratio is estimated for 2013 and then reduced 0.2 per-
centage points a year. If Congress does not adopt policy
changes that achieve the goals for the debt-GDP ratio, a
sequester of spending modeled on the one designed by
the BCA goes into effect. An equal amount is obtained from
the revenue side by a proportional reduction in itemized
deductions and exclusions for couples with more than
$250,000 in income and singles with more than $200,000.
The total amount of the required adjustment is limited,
whether it is achieved by deliberate policy actions or
automatically. As noted in our earlier discussion of the
automatic mechanism contained in the framework, such
a limit is useful because it reduces the likelihood Con-
gress will abandon the enforcement process altogether.
The enforcement process is temporarily suspended in
times of economic weakness.
As noted previously, the CRFB has estimated that 
the specific program proposals in the president’s plan
would increase the debt-GDP ratio to over 70 percent by
2021. In contrast, the above enforcement mechanism
requires a continual reduction in the debt-GDP ratio.
Thus, Congress would have to pass spending cuts and/or
tax increases that go considerably beyond those in the
president’s plan.
The BCA’s Bias against 
Discretionary Spending
As a result of its spending caps and the design of the
sequester, the BCA focuses on reducing the deficit by
constraining discretionary spending when discretionary
spending has not played an important role in causing the
long-run budget problems. While discretionary spending
has recently been bloated by the stimulus program, the
caps and the sequester imposed by the BCA would far
more than make up for this bloat. It is very likely that if all
the rules are followed, nondefense discretionary spending
would fall below 3 percent of GDP—the lowest level since
World War II.
Given that Social Security and health spending are
responsible for essentially all the long-run spending prob-
lem, it is ironic that the BCA totally exempts Social Secu-
rity and Medicaid from the sequester and limits the cut in
Medicare to 2 percent. The act formalizes a phenomenon
that has been under way for years. The automatic growth
in health and Social Security is squeezing out all other
functions of government.
Conclusion
It is an understatement to say that this has been a dis-
couraging year for anyone hoping for a more responsi-
ble fiscal policy. The chaos surrounding the debate over 
the debt limit in midsummer and the total failure of the
super committee that emerged from that chaos show that
the country’s fiscal policy-making machinery is terribly
broken. That is not to say there has been zero progress. The
cumulative saving of almost $900 billion associated with
the discretionary spending caps imposed by the BCA is a
significant sum. If $1.2 trillion is added either by a
sequester or a more rational deficit reduction plan, the
total deficit reduction of $2.1 trillion gets the nation about
halfway to the roughly $4 trillion deficit reduction gener-
ally associated with stabilizing the debt-GDP ratio in the
long run.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to be confident that $2.1
trillion in deficit reduction will actually materialize. It is
spread over 10 years and a number of different Congresses.
Any rules imposed by one Congress can be broken by
another. Indeed, past Congresses have not been shy about
breaking their own rules.
Because the nation will make some progress against
the deficit if the rules of the BCA are followed, and
because Republicans are showing some signs of weaken-
ing their total opposition to tax increases, the future is
not totally bleak. Negotiations that build on the deficit
reductions imposed by the BCA could be productive.
But a huge ideological gap remains between the two
political parties, and progress will be elusive unless both
sides show more willingness to get things done for the
good of the country. Without more progress, the nation
will continue its march toward a sovereign debt crisis of
Greek proportions. No one can predict when that might
occur, but the risks are enormous, and it is time our
leaders begin to lower them.
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and half from nondefense budget authority. However,
Social Security and a number of programs focused on poor
people are exempted from the cut. The cut to Medicare is
capped at 2 percent and limited to provider reimbursement.
CBO has provided approximations of the cuts in appro-
priations and in mandatory programs that will occur if the
sequester goes through. These are approximations because
CBO will not administer the automatic cuts. That will be
done by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and
in some areas the automatic cuts could be administered
several different ways. Note that automatic cuts are applied
to budget authority, not to outlays. Outlay cuts will be less
severe because outlays tend to lag budget authority.
The automatic cut in appropriations for defense discre-
tionary spending would be 10 percent in 2013 and then
gradually fall to 8.5 percent by 2021. The cumulative reduc-
tion over 10 years is $492 billion. The cuts in nondefense
discretionary spending and in the non-exempted, non-
defense mandatory programs would be 7.8 percent in 2013,
falling to 5.5 percent in 2021. The total reduction in budget
authority is $492 billion, identical to that in the defense
budget. The 2 percent cut in Medicare saves $123 billion of
this amount. Indirect debt service savings amount to
$169 billion. In total, the automatic cut in budget authority
leads to outlay savings of $1.1 trillion cumulatively. The cut
in outlays is less than the required $1.2 trillion cut in budget
authority because of the aforementioned time lags.18
Since the failure of the super committee, a number of
Republicans and Democrats have argued that the across-the-
board cuts that are now supposed to occur in the defense
budget would dangerously weaken the nation. Senator John
McCain has introduced legislation that would suspend those
cuts. It is hard to believe that the defense cuts could be sus-
pended without doing the same for the nondefense budget.
The president has responded that the cuts must be
implemented and has vowed to veto any legislation that
would suspend them. He hopes that this threat will force
Congress to return to the bargaining table and to agree to
something more sensible than across-the-board cuts.
Although it is hard to find anything to be encouraged
about after the super committee’s abysmal failure, there is
a very slight chance that a return to the bargaining table
could yield some success. The most important positive
development during the committee’s deliberations was an
offer by the Republicans to open the door a tiny crack to
tax increases. It was particularly significant that the vehe-
mently anti-tax committee member Senator Pat Toomey
put the offer on the table. He joins Republican Senators
Crapo and Coburn and then-Senator Gregg who endorsed
tax increases as members of the president’s fiscal commis-
sion. The expiration of the Bush tax cuts at the end of
2012 creates another reason to bargain productively. If the
adamant Republican opposition to tax increases contin-
ues to weaken and Democrats can be persuaded to accept
meaningful reforms in Social Security, Medicare, and Med-
icaid, there is some hope of a balanced solution for Amer-
ica’s fiscal woes in the near term. However, the hope is a slim
one. The two parties are still very far apart, and it will require
much compromising to reach a viable solution.
If negotiations are resumed, it becomes relevant that in
responding to the BCA the president urged the super com-
mittee to “go big” and exceed the goal of deficit savings of
$1.5 trillion over 10 years. The plan he provided the com-
mittee is generally consistent with his earlier framework
and would probably serve as his initial bargaining posi-
tion in any further negotiations. Obama claimed his plan
would save $4.4 trillion, but unfortunately that total included
savings from ending the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, thus
reducing the credibility of his proposal. The CRFB estimates
Obama’s plan would save $1.9 trillion, not counting the
$900 billion saved by the spending caps already put in place
by the BCA. Although the president’s plan would save some-
what more than the super committee’s goal of $1.5 trillion,
it falls short of stabilizing the debt-GDP ratio. CRFB esti-
mates that the ratio would be 74 percent in 2021 under the
president’s plan compared with the 66 percent achieved by
the HBC and the president’s fiscal commission. This ratio
was 62 percent at the end of 2010.
The president’s new plan yields roughly the same mag-
nitude of deficit saving as his framework described earlier,
although some saving is used to pay for a newly designed
jobs initiative. (That initiative will not be discussed here,
because the spending portions of the initiative are modest
and short term.) But the new plan is much more detailed
(except with respect to Social Security, about which it is
silent). For example, there are very specific recommenda-
tions for reducing payments to providers and subsidies to
medical schools under Medicare. Considerable amounts are
saved for Medicare Part D by having drug companies pro-
vide rebates similar to those in the Medicaid program. Newly
enrolled Part B recipients would face higher deductibles,
and the more affluent would pay higher Part B and D pre-
miums. Over three years starting in 2013, civil servants are
expected to contribute an extra 1.2 percent of wages to
their defined benefit retirement plans, and military per-
sonnel and retirees and their dependents are expected to
pay a higher cost share for their health plan. Numerous
increases in fees and insurance premiums are proposed as
are sales of government properties. It is impossible to con-
vey the richness of the plan’s details in a short discussion;
for that, the reader is referred to the official document
describing the plan (OMB 2011).
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do not show the debt-GDP ratio declining in the second
half of the decade. The cuts would be designed to lower
the deficit to an average 2.8 percent of GDP over that
period.
There are several important differences between the
mechanisms designed by the HBR and the president:
● The president’s approach cuts spending and raises
revenues automatically by cutting tax expenditures.
● The president exempts Social Security, low-income pro-
grams, and benefits for Medicare enrollees from auto-
matic spending cuts. But there is a separate sequester
mechanism for Medicare if its expenditure growth exceeds
the president’s GDP + 0.5 percent target. Presumably, this
sequester would focus on provider reimbursement and
not on beneficiary cost-sharing.
● The president’s trigger would include a mechanism to
ensure that it does not exacerbate an economic down-
turn or interfere with the nation’s ability to respond to
a national security emergency.
The history of fiscal policy shows that automatic mech-
anisms often fail. They are generally abandoned when they
become too painful to be tolerated politically. That hap-
pened to the automatic spending cuts embedded in the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law of 1985, whose main pro-
visions were abandoned in 1990. Similarly, as noted ear-
lier, a provision intended to cut physician reimbursements
under Medicare is routinely waived because the required
cuts are now so large that they would drive physicians
out of the program. But some automatic mechanisms
have worked quite well. For example, Part B standard
Medicare premiums are raised each year so they continue
to finance 25 percent of the overall cost of the program.
Are the mechanisms designed by HBR and the president
likely to suffer the same fate as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings?
In some respects, the president’s automatic trigger is less
likely to be abandoned because it spreads the pain of deficit
cutting over both the tax and spending sides of the budget
and it has an escape clause in the event of an economic
downturn. Yet, the diffusion of some pain to the tax side of
the budget is countered to some degree because large exemp-
tions focus the pain on only a portion of total spending.
The goal of the cuts in the president’s plan is to lower the
five-year average deficit to 2.8 percent of GDP. The deficit
is highly volatile, affected by numerous random variables
other than overall economic activity. It could soar and force
very large cuts even in the absence of an economic down-
turn. By focusing on spending levels, HBR has a much less
volatile and therefore more predictable target. Neverthe-
less, spending levels are also affected by cyclical factors to
some degree.
It is very challenging to design an automatic mecha-
nism that can survive a bit of bad luck. It may be wise to
place limits on the pain imposed by a sequester. An auto-
matic mechanism is more likely to survive if automatic
cuts are not allowed to exceed some absolute amount, such
as 1 percent of GDP.
The Budget Control Act
The debate over the debt limit was a low point in the his-
tory of U.S. budgeting. There were many starts and stops
with aborted deals and much posturing. It was impossible
to predict from day to day where the debate would go, and
at times, the unthinkable—a default on U.S. sovereign
debt—seemed quite possible. House Speaker Boehner held
fast to a goal of reducing the deficit dollar for dollar for any
increase in the debt limit. (It was never clear over what
period the deficit cut was supposed to occur.) For most of
the negotiations, the Speaker insisted that the entire deficit
reduction come from spending cuts, although for a brief
period he and the president were discussing a very large
deficit-reduction package that would have included some
tax increases. Meanwhile, the president wanted a big enough
increase in the debt limit that the issue would not have to
be revisited before the next presidential election.
In the end, Congress and the president agreed to the
Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA), which has two parts.
The first imposes caps on discretionary appropriations
through 2021 that save a cumulative $756 billion starting in
201215 and makes changes in student loans and Pell grants
that save a cumulative $5 billion over the same 10 years. For
2012 and 2013, the BCA has separate caps on appropria-
tions for security and non-security spending. After 2013,
a single cap will apply to total discretionary appropria-
tions. The discretionary caps in the BCA are somewhat
more lenient than the caps in the HBR. The BCA’s discre-
tionary caps and education reforms will result in addi-
tional interest savings of $134 billion.16 In total, the first
part of the BCA will reduce the cumulative deficit by
$895 billion from 2012 through 2021.
The second part of the BCA created a Congressional Joint
Select Committee on Deficit Reduction, dubbed the super
committee, which consisted of 12 members: 3 Republicans
and 3 Democrats from each of the House and Senate. The
committee was instructed to reduce the deficit by a cumu-
lative $1.5 trillion from 2012 through 2021. In the end, it
could not agree to any deficit reductions at all. Accord-
ing to the BCA, the super committee’s failure implies that
there will be an automatic, across-the-board cut in budget
authority17 of $1.2 trillion over 10 years starting in January
2013. Half the cut is to come from defense budget authority
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Members of the electorate spoke loudly in November 2010, when their votes added 63
Republicans to the House of Representatives, resulting in a historical change in its
party composition. A major concern of voters was the ballooning federal debt, which
the Congressional Budget Office projected would grow in the long run at an increas-
ing rate (Congressional Budget Office 2011b). Health programs and, to a lesser
extent, Social Security lie at the root of the long-term problem. Their costs are
approaching 50 percent of noninterest federal spending, and both will continue to
grow faster than tax revenues and the economy.
The president’s budget for fiscal year 2012 issued in February 2011 did not attack the
main sources of spending growth or propose sufficient tax increases to finance such
growth. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), his budget implied rising
deficits relative to GDP after 2015 and a national debt that increases from 62.1 percent
of GDP in 2010 to 87.4 percent in 2021 (CBO 2011a).
A number of private groups were more concerned about the budget situation, con-
cluding that current fiscal policies were not sustainable. They put forward several dif-
ferent policy options that would put the budget on a healthier path. An early effort,
sponsored by the National Academies of Science and Public Administration and co-
chaired by the authors of this report, described four packages that ranged from one in
which fiscal sustainability was achieved entirely by cutting spending to one that relied
entirely on tax increases, with two intermediate packages relying on different mixes of
tax increases and spending cuts (National Research Council and National Academy of
Public Administration 2010). A Bipartisan Policy Center Deficit Reduction Task Force
(DRTF) put forward a detailed plan that was evenly balanced between tax increases and
spending cuts (Domenici and Rivlin 2010). The Peter G. Peterson Foundation spon-
sored six think tanks, including the Bipartisan Policy Center, to develop plans to restore
fiscal stability that spanned the ideological spectrum (Peter J. Peterson Foundation 2011).
However, plans from private sources seldom get the same attention as those with
official backing. In early 2010, the president appointed his own National Commission
on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform. Its report, “The Moment of Truth,” was issued
in December 2010 (Palmer and Penner 2011). The plan cut about $4 trillion from the
projected cumulative deficit through 2021. Not counting interest savings, cuts in spend-
ing accounted for about 70 percent of the deficit reduction, while revenue increases
1
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accounted for about 30 percent. The debt-GDP ratio would
be cut to 60 percent of GDP by the early 2020s and would
continue to decline in the very long run, falling below
40 percent by 2040 (Palmer and Penner 2011).
Although praised by large numbers of outside budget
experts, the report was not greeted with great enthusiasm
by elected officials. Republicans generally objected to the
commission’s proposed increase in the overall tax burden
while Democrats generally opposed the commission’s
Social Security reforms and were concerned about the
constraints on Medicare and Medicaid spending. The pres-
ident remained aloof from his own commission’s recom-
mendations, neither giving them support nor opposing
them strongly.
House Republicans passed a budget in April 2011, largely
based on the proposals of Chairman Ryan of the House
Budget Committee (HBC). The president responded
with his own budget framework. This paper spends con-
siderable time describing these two approaches to long-
term deficit reduction because they starkly illustrate the
ideological gap between the president and the Republi-
can Party on this matter. It is also fair to say that many
congressional Democrats feel that the president’s propos-
als are not liberal enough, thus further heightening the
contrast between the two parties.
This paper also addresses the summer’s debate over the
debt limit—an irrational law that limits federal borrowing
in a manner unrelated to and totally inconsistent with
spending and taxing decisions already made. This law, how-
ever, gives legislators enormous bargaining power, because
a failure to raise the limit means either a default on the
national debt or draconian cuts in spending or increases in
taxes. The highly confused debt limit debate led to the Bud-
get Control Act of 2011, which will be discussed in detail.
The House Republican Budget 
and the President’s Framework
The first comprehensive budget plan from a prominent
elected official came from Paul Ryan, chairman of the House
Budget Committee.1 The plan was incorporated into the
House Concurrent Budget Resolution (HBR) for fiscal year
2012 and passed by the Republican majority with only four
Republicans dissenting and no support from Democrats.
In analyzing the size of the deficit cuts proposed by dif-
ferent plans, it is always important to ask “Compared to
what?” because different groups tend to use different base-
lines in their analyses. The choice of revenue and spending
baselines also affects computations that purport to show
the amount of deficit reduction coming from tax increases
compared with that coming from spending reductions.
Unless otherwise stated, this analysis will use the numbers
estimated by the Committee for a Responsible Federal Bud-
get (CRFB). The CRFB compares various plans to a base-
line that is very similar to what the CBO calls an adjusted
baseline. That baseline does not assume that tax and spend-
ing laws will remain the same forever—as does the CBO’s
unadjusted baseline—because many tax and spending poli-
cies have been routinely continued, even though the law says
they are temporary. For example, every year Congress alters
the alternative minimum tax to prevent it from afflicting a
rapidly growing portion of the population and suspends a
law calling for drastic cuts in physician reimbursements in
Medicare. The adjusted CBO baseline assumes that these
policies as well as the Bush tax cuts, currently scheduled to
expire at the end of 2012, are all continued. The CRFB num-
bers follow the CBO adjusted baseline except for assuming
that the Bush tax cuts will continue only for the non-rich—
that is, couples with less than $250,000 of income and
singles with income under $200,000. The CRFB baseline
also assumes the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan end.
The HBR adhered to the target set by the fiscal com-
mission and cut the deficit by a cumulative $4 trillion over
10 years. The president responded with his own “frame-
work” for deficit reduction, which took 12 years to accom-
plish the same goal.2 Over 10 years, CRFB estimates that
the president’s framework would cut the deficit only
$2.5 trillion; that is to say, its largest deficit cuts occur in
the last two years of his 12-year horizon. By 2020, the total
federal tax burden would equal 18 percent under the HBR
and 19.5 percent under the president’s framework. Spend-
ing would be 20.0 percent under the HBR and 22.5 percent
under the president’s framework. The former would bring
the debt-GDP ratio down to 70 percent, and the latter would
bring it to 76 percent. By 2040, the HBR would have the
debt-GDP ratio at 48 percent. CRFB does not estimate a
comparable figure for the president’s framework. How-
ever, Obama has stated that his goal is to have the ratio on
a declining path in the last half of this decade and, we pre-
sume, to continue to reduce it in the very long run.
Neither the HBR nor the president’s framework includes
highly detailed policy prescriptions. Budget resolutions
generally set broad goals and leave the details up to various
congressional committees. The HBR is, in fact, more spe-
cific than usual. The president’s proposals are vaguer and
only provide a general framework for how he would accom-
plish his deficit reduction goals—just as he labeled his
approach. The HBR, however, provides quite a bit of detail
regarding the reforms that it advocates for health programs,
and the president’s framework is also more detailed on this
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The President’s Framework
The president proposes significant cuts in discretionary
spending that would bring the totals in line with levels pro-
posed by his fiscal commission. No details are provided,
but the administration estimates 10-year cuts in security
spending of $290 billion and 12-year cuts of $400 billion.
Non-security spending would be cut $620 billion over
10 years and $770 billion over 12 years. Using a some-
what different baseline, CRFB has lowered the estimate of
10-year saving from $290 to $130 billion for the security
budget and from $620 to $450 billion for non-security
spending. The differences in the estimates again illustrate
the crucial importance of specifying what the cuts are from
when estimating “savings.”
Tax Policy
Superficially, the HBR and the president’s framework
appear to be on the same page philosophically when it
comes to tax policy. Both endorse the basic approach of
the president’s fiscal commission to greatly simplify the tax
code by eliminating many deductions, exclusions, and
credits; and both want to use some or all revenues derived
from simplification to lower marginal tax rates. Moreover,
the HBR and the president want to use the same approach
for both the individual and corporate income tax systems.
However, the superficial similarities between the two
approaches mask profound differences in the long-run tax
systems envisioned. Most important, roughly $1 trillion of
the president’s proposed $4 trillion in deficit reduction
comes from increasing taxes. This is on top of his desire to
end the Bush tax cuts for the more affluent. In contrast, the
HBR starts with the presumption that all the Bush tax cuts
are continued. As the tax base is broadened and rates low-
ered, the overall federal tax burden stays between 18 and
19 percent of GDP.
According to CRFB calculations, the overall burden in
2020 would be 18 percent under the HRB and 19.5 percent
under the president’s framework—a difference of a little
more than 8 percent. Further HBC computations show the
tax burden under its plan rising in the very long run to an
apparent cap of 19 percent.14 It is unclear what the presi-
dent’s framework intends for the very long run, but it is
probably safe to say that the overall tax burden would con-
tinue to grow relative to that in the HBR. There would also
be important differences in how the tax burden is distrib-
uted between savings and investment on the one hand and
consumption on the other, with the HBR plan much more
lenient toward the former.
As the Bush tax cuts expire at the end of 2012, the presi-
dent’s proposal would raise the top rate on capital gains and
dividends from 15 to 20 percent. The Affordable Care Act
imposes an additional surtax of 3.8 percent on the invest-
ment income of more affluent taxpayers and a luxury tax on
especially expensive employer-financed health insurance.
The HBR eliminates the surtax, and while it does not specify
the rate on capital gains and dividends—that is the job of the
Ways and Means Committee—it does state that “Tax reform
should favor savings and investments because more savings
and investments mean a larger stock of capital available for
tax reform.” It is probably safe to assume that a Republican
tax reform would eliminate the current exclusion from tax-
able income of the value of employer-financed health insur-
ance. The luxury tax imposed by the ACA is an imperfect
substitute for this more radical reform.
Because the HBR tax reform process starts with a lower
presumed top rate than the president’s reform and because
it is very likely to favor investment income, the end result is
almost certain to be a less progressive tax system than under
the president’s framework. This reflects differences in the
beliefs of the two political parties regarding the proper role
of government in redistributing income and how strongly
lower marginal tax rates stimulate saving and investment.
Budget Process and Rules
Both the HBR and the president’s framework depend on
automatic mechanisms to enforce fiscal discipline. The HBR
imposes separate caps on total spending and on discre-
tionary spending, consistent with the totals specified for
10 years by the resolution, which would be enforced with
automatic across-the-board cuts. Any increase in the
debt limit would have to be accompanied by legislation that 
reaffirms the spending targets outlined in the HBR. In addi-
tion, there would be points of order (requiring a super-
majority to override in the Senate) against any legislation
increasing mandatory spending beyond the 10-year budget
horizon used by the HBR. Finally, Congress would be
required to review mandatory spending programs regularly
and move toward requiring appropriations for mandatory
programs. This would be a radical change if the appropria-
tions were used to restrict cost growth in the programs, but
it would also be pro forma if Congress simply appropriated
whatever sums the programs were expected to cost and
added supplementals when the estimates proved to be too
low. That has happened in the many years that the Food
Stamp Program has been an appropriated entitlement.
This failsafe mechanism also involves automatic cuts
in the deficit that would be triggered if budget projections
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higher taxes, at least for some with earnings above the
current cap.
Other Mandatory Spending
Mandatory spending includes spending related to con-
tractual obligations of the federal government, such as
paying for goods and services already purchased, and
entitlement spending. The latter refers to programs where
the law defines an eligible population and the benefits to
which they are entitled and then the government pays
the bill for all who apply for benefits. These are some-
times referred to as uncontrollable programs, but that is
not quite accurate because Congress can always change
the law that defines eligibility or the level of benefits.
Entitlements providing health insurance and Social Secu-
rity have already been discussed above. The following
examines how other, much smaller entitlements are han-
dled in the House Budget Resolution and the president’s
framework.
House Budget Resolution
Food stamps, now known as the Special Nutrition Assis-
tance Program (SNAP), would be reformed in the same way
that welfare was reformed in the late 1990s: the program
would be financed with a block grant, states would be given
considerable freedom to design the program to suit their eli-
gible population, and beneficiaries would be expected to get
jobs or participate in job training programs. The budget for
the block grant would be increased with the CPI and the size
of the eligible population starting in 2015, when it is pre-
sumed that unemployment has reached more normal lev-
els. Housing assistance would be made less generous and
also subjected to work requirements.
Direct payments to farmers (other than price supports)
would be reduced, and crop insurance would be reformed.
Reforms would be implemented when farm programs are
reauthorized, and the expected saving over the next decade
would be $30 billion out of $153 billion.
The HBR also advocates cutting fringe benefits for civil
servants, but no details are provided.
Total savings in other mandatory programs are esti-
mated at $719 billion for 2012–21 compared with the CBO
baseline. The implied cut from the baseline is a little less
than 20 percent. The HBR does not provide enough detail
to accurately apportion all the targeted savings between
income security or safety net programs and mandatory
payments to more affluent recipients, such as owners of
large farms.
The President’s Framework
The president proposes to save $360 billion from other
mandatory programs from 2012 to 2023. The framework
mentions reforming agricultural subsidies and the federal
pension insurance system while restoring solvency to the
federal unemployment insurance trust fund and attack-
ing fraud. No details are provided, but the framework
does say that reforms should “protect and strengthen the
safety net for low-income families and other vulnerable
Americans.”
Discretionary Spending
The CRFB estimates that the president’s framework would
reduce discretionary spending over a 10-year period by
$580 billion, compared with CRFB’s adjusted baseline.
The HBR is much more ambitious, cutting $1,590 billion.
House Budget Resolution
Former Secretary Gates identified $178 billion in defense
cuts over 10 years. The HBR would accept these cuts, allo-
cating $100 billion of the saving to “higher military priori-
ties” and using $78 billion for deficit reduction. Between
2011 and 2021, defense appropriations would rise 2.3 per-
cent a year on average, marginally above the assumed rate of
inflation. If spending related to the Iraq and Afghan wars
declines, as expected, that would allow for a greater increase
in regular, inflation-adjusted defense spending. Although
the HBR estimates that its net cut in defense spending
reduces the deficit $78 billion, it actually increases defense
spending by $90 billion relative to the CRFB baseline. The
difference occurs because the CRFB baseline eliminates war
spending whereas the savings estimate proposed by Secretary
Gates and accepted by the HBR does not.
The HBR cuts budget authority for non-security dis-
cretionary spending below 2008 levels and then freezes it
for five years. By 2017, outlays are 30 percent below the
stimulus-enhanced level of 2011. A significant portion of
the savings is focused on the civil service. Its numbers are
cut 10 percent over three years through attrition, and pay
is frozen for five years.
Few other details are provided for the non-security cuts.
The House Appropriations Committee is left with the chal-
lenging task of filling in the details. However, most appro-
priations cover only one year—in this case, 2012. The real
challenge will be maintaining the severe budget austerity
recommended by the HBR for the years following 2012. As
described later, long-run spending discipline would be
enforced by spending caps using sequesters.
6 Controlling the Deficit: The Debate Continues
topic than on other issues. Both plans are extremely vague
about how they would reform Social Security—testimony
to the extreme political popularity of the program (table 1).
Health Care
Health care–related deficit savings figure prominently in
the president’s framework but far more so in the HBR, since
it calls for repealing certain deficit-increasing portions of
last year’s health reform legislation and, in conjunction
with a radical restructuring of the federal role in Medicare
and Medicaid, imposes highly stringent limits on future
rates of growth of program costs. In contrast, the president
builds on last year’s health reforms and proposes relatively
modest further changes to Medicare and Medicaid, several
of which were also recommended by his presidential com-
mission and the DRTF (Palmer and Penner 2010). As a
result, health care in the HBR accounts for $1.4 trillion in
total deficit savings over the next decade and a huge annual
amount—perhaps as much as 9 percent of GDP (the equiv-
alent of $1.3 trillion in annual savings in today’s terms)—
by midcentury, whereas in the president’s framework it
accounts for only $320 billion in total deficit savings over
the next decade and no more than 2 percent of GDP annu-
ally by midcentury.3 There is ample reason to question the
credibility of the health-related deficit savings promised by
each plan, particularly over the long run. However, both
attempt to impose a budget constraint on federal spend-
ing for health care spending, while offering very different
approaches to achieving it.
House Budget Resolution
Virtually all the HBR deficit savings in health care comes
from three major components:
● Repealing health reform. The coverage expansion in the
Affordable Care Act (ACA), estimated to decrease the
number of uninsured people by 32–34 million annually
over the next 10 years, would be repealed along with the
new sources of revenues to help finance the expansion.
The plan would also repeal the Independent Payment
Advisory Board (IPAB), created under the ACA to help
restrain long-term Medicare spending growth, which
HBR severely criticizes as a heavy-handed regulatory
approach to cost control. However, ACA provisions that
cut Medicare provider reimbursement considerably in the
near term would be retained and the savings dedicated to
deficit reduction instead of coverage expansion.
● Converting Medicare to premium support. Medicare
would be converted from a defined benefit program to
a premium support system for those now under age 55.
Beneficiaries initially would receive an average subsidy
equivalent to currently projected per capita Medicare
spending in 2022 ($8,000) for the purchase of any of
numerous private plans participating in a new Medicare
exchange that offers benefit packages meeting at least a
specified minimum standard, accepts all applicants, and
charges the same price for everyone of the same age.4 (The
subsidies would be lower for high-income beneficiaries,
and low-income beneficiaries would receive additional
federal funds through medical savings accounts.) In
future years, the premium subsidies would be indexed to
the general rate of inflation, which CBO projects to be
well below the growth rate of the costs of Medicare-
covered services per beneficiary—thus accounting for
the lion’s share of long-term health care savings to the
federal government in the HBC plan. Additional savings
would come from gradually increasing the age of eligi-
bility for the subsidies from 65 to 67.
Controlling the Deficit: The Debate Continues 3
Table 1 10-Year Savings under the President’s
Framework and the House Budget 
Resolution for Fiscal Year 2012 against
an Adjusted Baseline ($ billions)
House
President’s Budget
framework Resolution
Security spending changes $130 −$90
Nonsecurity discretionary cuts $450 $1,680
Social Security reform N/A N/A
Repeal of select provisions
of health reform N/A $590a
Other health spending reductions $340 $800
Other mandatory spending cuts $290 $980
Tax reform and revenue changes $760a −$610
Interest savings $510 $650
Total deficit reduction $2,480 $4,020
Total deficits $6,990 $5,450
Source: Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget (CRFB), 
Analyzing the President’s New Budget Framework (Washington,
DC: CRFB, 2011), fig. 4.
Notes: Negative numbers represent costs as opposed to savings.
Numbers may not sum to totals because of rounding. All numbers
are estimated by the CRFB using data from the Congressional
Budget Office, the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility
and Reform, and the Obama administration. Estimates should be
considered rough and are subject to considerable uncertainty.
N/A not applicable
a. Includes revenue and outlay effects.
● Converting Medicaid to a block grant. The federal role
in Medicaid would be transformed by converting current
open-ended federal cost-sharing to closed-ended block
grants to the states and allowing states considerably more
flexibility in the design and management of their pro-
grams. The federal block grants would grow each year
starting in 2013 only with inflation and population—or
about 4 percentage points less than the currently pro-
jected average annual growth rate in federal spending for
the program. Total savings would be nearly $800 billion
by 2022, at which point CBO estimates the federal gov-
ernment would be spending 35 percent less annually for
Medicaid than it would absent this change; by 2030, the
federal government would be spending 49 percent less
annually (CBO 2011c, 26).
The President’s Framework
The president would achieve most of his 10-year savings
through various measures affecting both Medicare and
Medicaid, including a new patient safety initiative to reduce
avoidable medical complications, steps to cut unnecessary
spending on prescription drugs, and efforts to stem abuse
and fraud. Specific to Medicaid, the president proposes
replacing the current federal matching formulae with a
single rate for all program spending that would reward
states for efficiency and increase during recessions. He pro-
poses to work with state governors to enact further reforms,
especially to encourage more efficient, higher quality care
for high-cost beneficiaries.
To further constrain long-term spending growth, the
president would reduce the ACA’s target for Medicare
spending growth and strengthen the role of the IPAB as
a backstop to other Medicare reforms. Under the ACA,
beginning in 2018, whenever per beneficiary Medicare
costs are projected to grow faster than per capita GDP +
1 percent annually (over the subsequent five years), the
advisory board must recommend policies to Congress to
constrain the growth rate to that of GDP + 1 percent; these
recommendations cannot alter the benefit structure and
are essentially restricted to changes in provider reimburse-
ment. Congress is then to enact either these policies or oth-
ers achieving equivalent savings; failing such action, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services must implement
measures to the same end. The president now proposes to
lower the spending target to the annual rate of growth of
per capita GDP + 0.5 percent—a rate consistent with cur-
rently projected Medicare spending and the additional pro-
gram reforms outlined in his framework—and to provide
IPAB with additional “tools to improve the quality of care
while reducing costs, including . . . value-based benefit
designs” and “enforcement mechanisms, such as an auto-
matic sequester”5 if policymakers fail to act to adequately
control cost growth.
Discussion
The HBR and the president’s plan for Medicare share a goal
essential to the ultimate success of any deficit reduction
plan: to substantially slow the growth of program spending
relative to GDP over the long term. But the plans differ
starkly on two key related issues: just how tightly should
such spending be constrained, and by what method?
The premium support method directly controls total
program spending and relies on competition among plans
in the Medicare exchange, along with greater beneficiary
skin in the game, to promote efficiencies in the market-
place that would slow cost increases for Medicare-covered
services without compromising quality of care. In con-
trast, the strengthened ACA approach controls total pro-
gram costs indirectly, with less certainty (except to the
extent sequestration is effectively employed), and relies
primarily on regulating the reimbursement of health care
providers and changing their incentives. Both approaches
have their problems.
The major concern with premium support is that ben-
eficiaries could face extraordinarily large increases in out-
of-pocket expenses if the cost of the minimum standard
package of Medicare-covered services is much greater ini-
tially under a private plan and/or increases much faster
than do the per capita federal subsidies. According to
CBO, this would be a severe problem under the HBR pro-
posal6 and, along with it effectively “ending Medicare as
we know it,” accounts for most of the harsh criticism 
the plan has encountered. However, these concerns
could be greatly ameliorated while still retaining a pre-
mium support structure—though not without sacrific-
ing on deficit savings. For example, the DRTF proposed
converting Medicare to a premium support program but
recommended indexing the government subsidies to the
growth rate of per capita GDP + 1 percent rather than to
the general rate of inflation, which is expected to average
much less annually. The DRTF also recommended that
Medicare enrollees be able to continue in the traditional
fee-for-service program, rather than choose a private plan,
if they prefer. (However, if federal spending per enrollee
in traditional Medicare for the benefits specified in the
legislation were to rise faster than GDP + 1 percent, ben-
eficiaries would have to pay an additional premium to
cover the difference.)7
4 Controlling the Deficit: The Debate Continues
Both the HBR and DRTF plans reflect the hope that
converting Medicare to a premium support approach will
result in the more efficient delivery of health care, but a
significant portion of their associated cost saving is bound
to come from shifting costs from the public sector to ben-
eficiaries, especially those who are better off. Although it is
common to compare beneficiary costs under reform pro-
posals to costs under the current Medicare program, it
should be emphasized that retaining the current Medicare
program in all its details is not a viable option. Fiscal sus-
tainability will not be attained without slowing health costs,
and slowing health costs will require Medicare reform.
Medicare “as we know it” is bound to change; the only
debate is over how drastically.
The major concern with the strengthened ACA method
of constraining Medicare program costs is that regulating
the prices providers can charge Medicare beneficiaries is a
blunt instrument for promoting efficiencies and cost sav-
ings, and the future strictures on Medicare reimburse-
ment rates already promulgated under the ACA have been
deemed highly unlikely to be viable over the long term by
the program’s chief actuary because they will probably
decrease beneficiary access to care, among other concerns.8
Thus, achieving an even-lower long-term spending target
for Medicare—that is, one tied to the growth of GDP +
0.5 percent—by further empowering the IPAB and reduc-
ing provider reimbursement rates is highly questionable.
Such an approach also runs the risk of stifling, rather than
spurring, innovation. Plus, the political process is likely to
have a hard time dealing with the kind of rationing of low-
effectiveness procedures it might eventually entail.
The President’s Fiscal Commission report notably
mentioned both premium support and a strengthened
ACA as promising ways to restrain Medicare’s long-term
cost growth within prescribed bounds, though without
any discussion of their relative merits. But the commission
also recommended a target rate of growth indexed to GDP
+ 1 percent, not GDP + 0.5.
The differences between the HBR’s and president’s
approaches to restraining the long-term growth of federal
Medicaid spending parallel those pertaining to Medicare:
the HBR proposal would explicitly limit federal Medicaid
spending and index it in a way that would decrease spend-
ing sharply over time relative to current law, whereas the
president seeks to indirectly restrain the growth in such
spending far less dramatically and more indirectly within
the existing program structure. Here, too, both approaches
have their problems.
The major concern with the HBR block grant (beyond
elimination of the ACA provision to expand Medicaid
eligibility to millions more uninsured low-income Amer-
icans) is that any cost-saving efficiencies the states might
achieve will likely be overwhelmed by the huge reduction
in the share of federal funding over time, thus forcing states
to greatly reduce the scope of their programs and their low-
income populations to face much more limited access to
care. As for the minor tinkering with Medicaid proposed
by the president, unless the federal government chooses
to regulate state Medicaid programs much more highly
in the future as a condition of continued open-ended
cost-sharing (or to completely take over Medicaid as part
of a future comprehensive health reform), some sort of
closed-ended federal funding formula—such as already
employed for the State Children’s Health Insurance Pro-
gram (SCHIP)—may be essential to establish meaningful
limits and predictability to the long-term growth of federal
spending.9 This still could be accomplished, of course,
with a much more generous indexing formula for the fed-
eral grants than in the HBR proposal.10
Social Security
Although both the president’s framework and the Ryan
HBR include discussion of Social Security reform, neither
advances specific proposals nor assumes any contribution
from the program to future deficit savings in its projec-
tions or targets. Indeed, consistent with the president’s fis-
cal commission and DRTF recommendations for Social
Security, neither favors reforms that would reduce the
program’s basic benefits for current recipients or those
near retirement. But both also emphasize the need for
bipartisan agreement sooner rather than later on reform
measures to ensure continued program solvency over the
long term—a need further reinforced by the subsequent
issuance of the 2011 Social Security trustees’ report pro-
jecting further deterioration in the program’s financial sta-
tus.11 Accomplishing this goal inevitably would entail a
major contribution to long-term deficit savings, since
Social Security is now projected to run annual cash flow
deficits well above 1 percent of GDP in 2036 (when its
reserves will be exhausted) and beyond.12
Despite these areas of general agreement, the president
and Congressman Ryan clearly differ on the reform par-
ticulars they favor. Not surprisingly, Ryan eschews large
tax increases, such as would ensue from lifting the cap on
earnings subject to Social Security payroll taxes, and sup-
ports reforms that substantially slow the rate of benefit
growth for most future recipients. In contrast, Obama
rules out “an approach that slashes benefits for future
generations”13 and has in the past signaled support for
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● Converting Medicaid to a block grant. The federal role
in Medicaid would be transformed by converting current
open-ended federal cost-sharing to closed-ended block
grants to the states and allowing states considerably more
flexibility in the design and management of their pro-
grams. The federal block grants would grow each year
starting in 2013 only with inflation and population—or
about 4 percentage points less than the currently pro-
jected average annual growth rate in federal spending for
the program. Total savings would be nearly $800 billion
by 2022, at which point CBO estimates the federal gov-
ernment would be spending 35 percent less annually for
Medicaid than it would absent this change; by 2030, the
federal government would be spending 49 percent less
annually (CBO 2011c, 26).
The President’s Framework
The president would achieve most of his 10-year savings
through various measures affecting both Medicare and
Medicaid, including a new patient safety initiative to reduce
avoidable medical complications, steps to cut unnecessary
spending on prescription drugs, and efforts to stem abuse
and fraud. Specific to Medicaid, the president proposes
replacing the current federal matching formulae with a
single rate for all program spending that would reward
states for efficiency and increase during recessions. He pro-
poses to work with state governors to enact further reforms,
especially to encourage more efficient, higher quality care
for high-cost beneficiaries.
To further constrain long-term spending growth, the
president would reduce the ACA’s target for Medicare
spending growth and strengthen the role of the IPAB as
a backstop to other Medicare reforms. Under the ACA,
beginning in 2018, whenever per beneficiary Medicare
costs are projected to grow faster than per capita GDP +
1 percent annually (over the subsequent five years), the
advisory board must recommend policies to Congress to
constrain the growth rate to that of GDP + 1 percent; these
recommendations cannot alter the benefit structure and
are essentially restricted to changes in provider reimburse-
ment. Congress is then to enact either these policies or oth-
ers achieving equivalent savings; failing such action, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services must implement
measures to the same end. The president now proposes to
lower the spending target to the annual rate of growth of
per capita GDP + 0.5 percent—a rate consistent with cur-
rently projected Medicare spending and the additional pro-
gram reforms outlined in his framework—and to provide
IPAB with additional “tools to improve the quality of care
while reducing costs, including . . . value-based benefit
designs” and “enforcement mechanisms, such as an auto-
matic sequester”5 if policymakers fail to act to adequately
control cost growth.
Discussion
The HBR and the president’s plan for Medicare share a goal
essential to the ultimate success of any deficit reduction
plan: to substantially slow the growth of program spending
relative to GDP over the long term. But the plans differ
starkly on two key related issues: just how tightly should
such spending be constrained, and by what method?
The premium support method directly controls total
program spending and relies on competition among plans
in the Medicare exchange, along with greater beneficiary
skin in the game, to promote efficiencies in the market-
place that would slow cost increases for Medicare-covered
services without compromising quality of care. In con-
trast, the strengthened ACA approach controls total pro-
gram costs indirectly, with less certainty (except to the
extent sequestration is effectively employed), and relies
primarily on regulating the reimbursement of health care
providers and changing their incentives. Both approaches
have their problems.
The major concern with premium support is that ben-
eficiaries could face extraordinarily large increases in out-
of-pocket expenses if the cost of the minimum standard
package of Medicare-covered services is much greater ini-
tially under a private plan and/or increases much faster
than do the per capita federal subsidies. According to
CBO, this would be a severe problem under the HBR pro-
posal6 and, along with it effectively “ending Medicare as
we know it,” accounts for most of the harsh criticism 
the plan has encountered. However, these concerns
could be greatly ameliorated while still retaining a pre-
mium support structure—though not without sacrific-
ing on deficit savings. For example, the DRTF proposed
converting Medicare to a premium support program but
recommended indexing the government subsidies to the
growth rate of per capita GDP + 1 percent rather than to
the general rate of inflation, which is expected to average
much less annually. The DRTF also recommended that
Medicare enrollees be able to continue in the traditional
fee-for-service program, rather than choose a private plan,
if they prefer. (However, if federal spending per enrollee
in traditional Medicare for the benefits specified in the
legislation were to rise faster than GDP + 1 percent, ben-
eficiaries would have to pay an additional premium to
cover the difference.)7
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Both the HBR and DRTF plans reflect the hope that
converting Medicare to a premium support approach will
result in the more efficient delivery of health care, but a
significant portion of their associated cost saving is bound
to come from shifting costs from the public sector to ben-
eficiaries, especially those who are better off. Although it is
common to compare beneficiary costs under reform pro-
posals to costs under the current Medicare program, it
should be emphasized that retaining the current Medicare
program in all its details is not a viable option. Fiscal sus-
tainability will not be attained without slowing health costs,
and slowing health costs will require Medicare reform.
Medicare “as we know it” is bound to change; the only
debate is over how drastically.
The major concern with the strengthened ACA method
of constraining Medicare program costs is that regulating
the prices providers can charge Medicare beneficiaries is a
blunt instrument for promoting efficiencies and cost sav-
ings, and the future strictures on Medicare reimburse-
ment rates already promulgated under the ACA have been
deemed highly unlikely to be viable over the long term by
the program’s chief actuary because they will probably
decrease beneficiary access to care, among other concerns.8
Thus, achieving an even-lower long-term spending target
for Medicare—that is, one tied to the growth of GDP +
0.5 percent—by further empowering the IPAB and reduc-
ing provider reimbursement rates is highly questionable.
Such an approach also runs the risk of stifling, rather than
spurring, innovation. Plus, the political process is likely to
have a hard time dealing with the kind of rationing of low-
effectiveness procedures it might eventually entail.
The President’s Fiscal Commission report notably
mentioned both premium support and a strengthened
ACA as promising ways to restrain Medicare’s long-term
cost growth within prescribed bounds, though without
any discussion of their relative merits. But the commission
also recommended a target rate of growth indexed to GDP
+ 1 percent, not GDP + 0.5.
The differences between the HBR’s and president’s
approaches to restraining the long-term growth of federal
Medicaid spending parallel those pertaining to Medicare:
the HBR proposal would explicitly limit federal Medicaid
spending and index it in a way that would decrease spend-
ing sharply over time relative to current law, whereas the
president seeks to indirectly restrain the growth in such
spending far less dramatically and more indirectly within
the existing program structure. Here, too, both approaches
have their problems.
The major concern with the HBR block grant (beyond
elimination of the ACA provision to expand Medicaid
eligibility to millions more uninsured low-income Amer-
icans) is that any cost-saving efficiencies the states might
achieve will likely be overwhelmed by the huge reduction
in the share of federal funding over time, thus forcing states
to greatly reduce the scope of their programs and their low-
income populations to face much more limited access to
care. As for the minor tinkering with Medicaid proposed
by the president, unless the federal government chooses
to regulate state Medicaid programs much more highly
in the future as a condition of continued open-ended
cost-sharing (or to completely take over Medicaid as part
of a future comprehensive health reform), some sort of
closed-ended federal funding formula—such as already
employed for the State Children’s Health Insurance Pro-
gram (SCHIP)—may be essential to establish meaningful
limits and predictability to the long-term growth of federal
spending.9 This still could be accomplished, of course,
with a much more generous indexing formula for the fed-
eral grants than in the HBR proposal.10
Social Security
Although both the president’s framework and the Ryan
HBR include discussion of Social Security reform, neither
advances specific proposals nor assumes any contribution
from the program to future deficit savings in its projec-
tions or targets. Indeed, consistent with the president’s fis-
cal commission and DRTF recommendations for Social
Security, neither favors reforms that would reduce the
program’s basic benefits for current recipients or those
near retirement. But both also emphasize the need for
bipartisan agreement sooner rather than later on reform
measures to ensure continued program solvency over the
long term—a need further reinforced by the subsequent
issuance of the 2011 Social Security trustees’ report pro-
jecting further deterioration in the program’s financial sta-
tus.11 Accomplishing this goal inevitably would entail a
major contribution to long-term deficit savings, since
Social Security is now projected to run annual cash flow
deficits well above 1 percent of GDP in 2036 (when its
reserves will be exhausted) and beyond.12
Despite these areas of general agreement, the president
and Congressman Ryan clearly differ on the reform par-
ticulars they favor. Not surprisingly, Ryan eschews large
tax increases, such as would ensue from lifting the cap on
earnings subject to Social Security payroll taxes, and sup-
ports reforms that substantially slow the rate of benefit
growth for most future recipients. In contrast, Obama
rules out “an approach that slashes benefits for future
generations”13 and has in the past signaled support for
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higher taxes, at least for some with earnings above the
current cap.
Other Mandatory Spending
Mandatory spending includes spending related to con-
tractual obligations of the federal government, such as
paying for goods and services already purchased, and
entitlement spending. The latter refers to programs where
the law defines an eligible population and the benefits to
which they are entitled and then the government pays
the bill for all who apply for benefits. These are some-
times referred to as uncontrollable programs, but that is
not quite accurate because Congress can always change
the law that defines eligibility or the level of benefits.
Entitlements providing health insurance and Social Secu-
rity have already been discussed above. The following
examines how other, much smaller entitlements are han-
dled in the House Budget Resolution and the president’s
framework.
House Budget Resolution
Food stamps, now known as the Special Nutrition Assis-
tance Program (SNAP), would be reformed in the same way
that welfare was reformed in the late 1990s: the program
would be financed with a block grant, states would be given
considerable freedom to design the program to suit their eli-
gible population, and beneficiaries would be expected to get
jobs or participate in job training programs. The budget for
the block grant would be increased with the CPI and the size
of the eligible population starting in 2015, when it is pre-
sumed that unemployment has reached more normal lev-
els. Housing assistance would be made less generous and
also subjected to work requirements.
Direct payments to farmers (other than price supports)
would be reduced, and crop insurance would be reformed.
Reforms would be implemented when farm programs are
reauthorized, and the expected saving over the next decade
would be $30 billion out of $153 billion.
The HBR also advocates cutting fringe benefits for civil
servants, but no details are provided.
Total savings in other mandatory programs are esti-
mated at $719 billion for 2012–21 compared with the CBO
baseline. The implied cut from the baseline is a little less
than 20 percent. The HBR does not provide enough detail
to accurately apportion all the targeted savings between
income security or safety net programs and mandatory
payments to more affluent recipients, such as owners of
large farms.
The President’s Framework
The president proposes to save $360 billion from other
mandatory programs from 2012 to 2023. The framework
mentions reforming agricultural subsidies and the federal
pension insurance system while restoring solvency to the
federal unemployment insurance trust fund and attack-
ing fraud. No details are provided, but the framework
does say that reforms should “protect and strengthen the
safety net for low-income families and other vulnerable
Americans.”
Discretionary Spending
The CRFB estimates that the president’s framework would
reduce discretionary spending over a 10-year period by
$580 billion, compared with CRFB’s adjusted baseline.
The HBR is much more ambitious, cutting $1,590 billion.
House Budget Resolution
Former Secretary Gates identified $178 billion in defense
cuts over 10 years. The HBR would accept these cuts, allo-
cating $100 billion of the saving to “higher military priori-
ties” and using $78 billion for deficit reduction. Between
2011 and 2021, defense appropriations would rise 2.3 per-
cent a year on average, marginally above the assumed rate of
inflation. If spending related to the Iraq and Afghan wars
declines, as expected, that would allow for a greater increase
in regular, inflation-adjusted defense spending. Although
the HBR estimates that its net cut in defense spending
reduces the deficit $78 billion, it actually increases defense
spending by $90 billion relative to the CRFB baseline. The
difference occurs because the CRFB baseline eliminates war
spending whereas the savings estimate proposed by Secretary
Gates and accepted by the HBR does not.
The HBR cuts budget authority for non-security dis-
cretionary spending below 2008 levels and then freezes it
for five years. By 2017, outlays are 30 percent below the
stimulus-enhanced level of 2011. A significant portion of
the savings is focused on the civil service. Its numbers are
cut 10 percent over three years through attrition, and pay
is frozen for five years.
Few other details are provided for the non-security cuts.
The House Appropriations Committee is left with the chal-
lenging task of filling in the details. However, most appro-
priations cover only one year—in this case, 2012. The real
challenge will be maintaining the severe budget austerity
recommended by the HBR for the years following 2012. As
described later, long-run spending discipline would be
enforced by spending caps using sequesters.
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topic than on other issues. Both plans are extremely vague
about how they would reform Social Security—testimony
to the extreme political popularity of the program (table 1).
Health Care
Health care–related deficit savings figure prominently in
the president’s framework but far more so in the HBR, since
it calls for repealing certain deficit-increasing portions of
last year’s health reform legislation and, in conjunction
with a radical restructuring of the federal role in Medicare
and Medicaid, imposes highly stringent limits on future
rates of growth of program costs. In contrast, the president
builds on last year’s health reforms and proposes relatively
modest further changes to Medicare and Medicaid, several
of which were also recommended by his presidential com-
mission and the DRTF (Palmer and Penner 2010). As a
result, health care in the HBR accounts for $1.4 trillion in
total deficit savings over the next decade and a huge annual
amount—perhaps as much as 9 percent of GDP (the equiv-
alent of $1.3 trillion in annual savings in today’s terms)—
by midcentury, whereas in the president’s framework it
accounts for only $320 billion in total deficit savings over
the next decade and no more than 2 percent of GDP annu-
ally by midcentury.3 There is ample reason to question the
credibility of the health-related deficit savings promised by
each plan, particularly over the long run. However, both
attempt to impose a budget constraint on federal spend-
ing for health care spending, while offering very different
approaches to achieving it.
House Budget Resolution
Virtually all the HBR deficit savings in health care comes
from three major components:
● Repealing health reform. The coverage expansion in the
Affordable Care Act (ACA), estimated to decrease the
number of uninsured people by 32–34 million annually
over the next 10 years, would be repealed along with the
new sources of revenues to help finance the expansion.
The plan would also repeal the Independent Payment
Advisory Board (IPAB), created under the ACA to help
restrain long-term Medicare spending growth, which
HBR severely criticizes as a heavy-handed regulatory
approach to cost control. However, ACA provisions that
cut Medicare provider reimbursement considerably in the
near term would be retained and the savings dedicated to
deficit reduction instead of coverage expansion.
● Converting Medicare to premium support. Medicare
would be converted from a defined benefit program to
a premium support system for those now under age 55.
Beneficiaries initially would receive an average subsidy
equivalent to currently projected per capita Medicare
spending in 2022 ($8,000) for the purchase of any of
numerous private plans participating in a new Medicare
exchange that offers benefit packages meeting at least a
specified minimum standard, accepts all applicants, and
charges the same price for everyone of the same age.4 (The
subsidies would be lower for high-income beneficiaries,
and low-income beneficiaries would receive additional
federal funds through medical savings accounts.) In
future years, the premium subsidies would be indexed to
the general rate of inflation, which CBO projects to be
well below the growth rate of the costs of Medicare-
covered services per beneficiary—thus accounting for
the lion’s share of long-term health care savings to the
federal government in the HBC plan. Additional savings
would come from gradually increasing the age of eligi-
bility for the subsidies from 65 to 67.
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Table 1 10-Year Savings under the President’s
Framework and the House Budget 
Resolution for Fiscal Year 2012 against
an Adjusted Baseline ($ billions)
House
President’s Budget
framework Resolution
Security spending changes $130 −$90
Nonsecurity discretionary cuts $450 $1,680
Social Security reform N/A N/A
Repeal of select provisions
of health reform N/A $590a
Other health spending reductions $340 $800
Other mandatory spending cuts $290 $980
Tax reform and revenue changes $760a −$610
Interest savings $510 $650
Total deficit reduction $2,480 $4,020
Total deficits $6,990 $5,450
Source: Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget (CRFB), 
Analyzing the President’s New Budget Framework (Washington,
DC: CRFB, 2011), fig. 4.
Notes: Negative numbers represent costs as opposed to savings.
Numbers may not sum to totals because of rounding. All numbers
are estimated by the CRFB using data from the Congressional
Budget Office, the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility
and Reform, and the Obama administration. Estimates should be
considered rough and are subject to considerable uncertainty.
N/A not applicable
a. Includes revenue and outlay effects.
accounted for about 30 percent. The debt-GDP ratio would
be cut to 60 percent of GDP by the early 2020s and would
continue to decline in the very long run, falling below
40 percent by 2040 (Palmer and Penner 2011).
Although praised by large numbers of outside budget
experts, the report was not greeted with great enthusiasm
by elected officials. Republicans generally objected to the
commission’s proposed increase in the overall tax burden
while Democrats generally opposed the commission’s
Social Security reforms and were concerned about the
constraints on Medicare and Medicaid spending. The pres-
ident remained aloof from his own commission’s recom-
mendations, neither giving them support nor opposing
them strongly.
House Republicans passed a budget in April 2011, largely
based on the proposals of Chairman Ryan of the House
Budget Committee (HBC). The president responded
with his own budget framework. This paper spends con-
siderable time describing these two approaches to long-
term deficit reduction because they starkly illustrate the
ideological gap between the president and the Republi-
can Party on this matter. It is also fair to say that many
congressional Democrats feel that the president’s propos-
als are not liberal enough, thus further heightening the
contrast between the two parties.
This paper also addresses the summer’s debate over the
debt limit—an irrational law that limits federal borrowing
in a manner unrelated to and totally inconsistent with
spending and taxing decisions already made. This law, how-
ever, gives legislators enormous bargaining power, because
a failure to raise the limit means either a default on the
national debt or draconian cuts in spending or increases in
taxes. The highly confused debt limit debate led to the Bud-
get Control Act of 2011, which will be discussed in detail.
The House Republican Budget 
and the President’s Framework
The first comprehensive budget plan from a prominent
elected official came from Paul Ryan, chairman of the House
Budget Committee.1 The plan was incorporated into the
House Concurrent Budget Resolution (HBR) for fiscal year
2012 and passed by the Republican majority with only four
Republicans dissenting and no support from Democrats.
In analyzing the size of the deficit cuts proposed by dif-
ferent plans, it is always important to ask “Compared to
what?” because different groups tend to use different base-
lines in their analyses. The choice of revenue and spending
baselines also affects computations that purport to show
the amount of deficit reduction coming from tax increases
compared with that coming from spending reductions.
Unless otherwise stated, this analysis will use the numbers
estimated by the Committee for a Responsible Federal Bud-
get (CRFB). The CRFB compares various plans to a base-
line that is very similar to what the CBO calls an adjusted
baseline. That baseline does not assume that tax and spend-
ing laws will remain the same forever—as does the CBO’s
unadjusted baseline—because many tax and spending poli-
cies have been routinely continued, even though the law says
they are temporary. For example, every year Congress alters
the alternative minimum tax to prevent it from afflicting a
rapidly growing portion of the population and suspends a
law calling for drastic cuts in physician reimbursements in
Medicare. The adjusted CBO baseline assumes that these
policies as well as the Bush tax cuts, currently scheduled to
expire at the end of 2012, are all continued. The CRFB num-
bers follow the CBO adjusted baseline except for assuming
that the Bush tax cuts will continue only for the non-rich—
that is, couples with less than $250,000 of income and
singles with income under $200,000. The CRFB baseline
also assumes the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan end.
The HBR adhered to the target set by the fiscal com-
mission and cut the deficit by a cumulative $4 trillion over
10 years. The president responded with his own “frame-
work” for deficit reduction, which took 12 years to accom-
plish the same goal.2 Over 10 years, CRFB estimates that
the president’s framework would cut the deficit only
$2.5 trillion; that is to say, its largest deficit cuts occur in
the last two years of his 12-year horizon. By 2020, the total
federal tax burden would equal 18 percent under the HBR
and 19.5 percent under the president’s framework. Spend-
ing would be 20.0 percent under the HBR and 22.5 percent
under the president’s framework. The former would bring
the debt-GDP ratio down to 70 percent, and the latter would
bring it to 76 percent. By 2040, the HBR would have the
debt-GDP ratio at 48 percent. CRFB does not estimate a
comparable figure for the president’s framework. How-
ever, Obama has stated that his goal is to have the ratio on
a declining path in the last half of this decade and, we pre-
sume, to continue to reduce it in the very long run.
Neither the HBR nor the president’s framework includes
highly detailed policy prescriptions. Budget resolutions
generally set broad goals and leave the details up to various
congressional committees. The HBR is, in fact, more spe-
cific than usual. The president’s proposals are vaguer and
only provide a general framework for how he would accom-
plish his deficit reduction goals—just as he labeled his
approach. The HBR, however, provides quite a bit of detail
regarding the reforms that it advocates for health programs,
and the president’s framework is also more detailed on this
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The President’s Framework
The president proposes significant cuts in discretionary
spending that would bring the totals in line with levels pro-
posed by his fiscal commission. No details are provided,
but the administration estimates 10-year cuts in security
spending of $290 billion and 12-year cuts of $400 billion.
Non-security spending would be cut $620 billion over
10 years and $770 billion over 12 years. Using a some-
what different baseline, CRFB has lowered the estimate of
10-year saving from $290 to $130 billion for the security
budget and from $620 to $450 billion for non-security
spending. The differences in the estimates again illustrate
the crucial importance of specifying what the cuts are from
when estimating “savings.”
Tax Policy
Superficially, the HBR and the president’s framework
appear to be on the same page philosophically when it
comes to tax policy. Both endorse the basic approach of
the president’s fiscal commission to greatly simplify the tax
code by eliminating many deductions, exclusions, and
credits; and both want to use some or all revenues derived
from simplification to lower marginal tax rates. Moreover,
the HBR and the president want to use the same approach
for both the individual and corporate income tax systems.
However, the superficial similarities between the two
approaches mask profound differences in the long-run tax
systems envisioned. Most important, roughly $1 trillion of
the president’s proposed $4 trillion in deficit reduction
comes from increasing taxes. This is on top of his desire to
end the Bush tax cuts for the more affluent. In contrast, the
HBR starts with the presumption that all the Bush tax cuts
are continued. As the tax base is broadened and rates low-
ered, the overall federal tax burden stays between 18 and
19 percent of GDP.
According to CRFB calculations, the overall burden in
2020 would be 18 percent under the HRB and 19.5 percent
under the president’s framework—a difference of a little
more than 8 percent. Further HBC computations show the
tax burden under its plan rising in the very long run to an
apparent cap of 19 percent.14 It is unclear what the presi-
dent’s framework intends for the very long run, but it is
probably safe to say that the overall tax burden would con-
tinue to grow relative to that in the HBR. There would also
be important differences in how the tax burden is distrib-
uted between savings and investment on the one hand and
consumption on the other, with the HBR plan much more
lenient toward the former.
As the Bush tax cuts expire at the end of 2012, the presi-
dent’s proposal would raise the top rate on capital gains and
dividends from 15 to 20 percent. The Affordable Care Act
imposes an additional surtax of 3.8 percent on the invest-
ment income of more affluent taxpayers and a luxury tax on
especially expensive employer-financed health insurance.
The HBR eliminates the surtax, and while it does not specify
the rate on capital gains and dividends—that is the job of the
Ways and Means Committee—it does state that “Tax reform
should favor savings and investments because more savings
and investments mean a larger stock of capital available for
tax reform.” It is probably safe to assume that a Republican
tax reform would eliminate the current exclusion from tax-
able income of the value of employer-financed health insur-
ance. The luxury tax imposed by the ACA is an imperfect
substitute for this more radical reform.
Because the HBR tax reform process starts with a lower
presumed top rate than the president’s reform and because
it is very likely to favor investment income, the end result is
almost certain to be a less progressive tax system than under
the president’s framework. This reflects differences in the
beliefs of the two political parties regarding the proper role
of government in redistributing income and how strongly
lower marginal tax rates stimulate saving and investment.
Budget Process and Rules
Both the HBR and the president’s framework depend on
automatic mechanisms to enforce fiscal discipline. The HBR
imposes separate caps on total spending and on discre-
tionary spending, consistent with the totals specified for
10 years by the resolution, which would be enforced with
automatic across-the-board cuts. Any increase in the
debt limit would have to be accompanied by legislation that 
reaffirms the spending targets outlined in the HBR. In addi-
tion, there would be points of order (requiring a super-
majority to override in the Senate) against any legislation
increasing mandatory spending beyond the 10-year budget
horizon used by the HBR. Finally, Congress would be
required to review mandatory spending programs regularly
and move toward requiring appropriations for mandatory
programs. This would be a radical change if the appropria-
tions were used to restrict cost growth in the programs, but
it would also be pro forma if Congress simply appropriated
whatever sums the programs were expected to cost and
added supplementals when the estimates proved to be too
low. That has happened in the many years that the Food
Stamp Program has been an appropriated entitlement.
This failsafe mechanism also involves automatic cuts
in the deficit that would be triggered if budget projections
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do not show the debt-GDP ratio declining in the second
half of the decade. The cuts would be designed to lower
the deficit to an average 2.8 percent of GDP over that
period.
There are several important differences between the
mechanisms designed by the HBR and the president:
● The president’s approach cuts spending and raises
revenues automatically by cutting tax expenditures.
● The president exempts Social Security, low-income pro-
grams, and benefits for Medicare enrollees from auto-
matic spending cuts. But there is a separate sequester
mechanism for Medicare if its expenditure growth exceeds
the president’s GDP + 0.5 percent target. Presumably, this
sequester would focus on provider reimbursement and
not on beneficiary cost-sharing.
● The president’s trigger would include a mechanism to
ensure that it does not exacerbate an economic down-
turn or interfere with the nation’s ability to respond to
a national security emergency.
The history of fiscal policy shows that automatic mech-
anisms often fail. They are generally abandoned when they
become too painful to be tolerated politically. That hap-
pened to the automatic spending cuts embedded in the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law of 1985, whose main pro-
visions were abandoned in 1990. Similarly, as noted ear-
lier, a provision intended to cut physician reimbursements
under Medicare is routinely waived because the required
cuts are now so large that they would drive physicians
out of the program. But some automatic mechanisms
have worked quite well. For example, Part B standard
Medicare premiums are raised each year so they continue
to finance 25 percent of the overall cost of the program.
Are the mechanisms designed by HBR and the president
likely to suffer the same fate as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings?
In some respects, the president’s automatic trigger is less
likely to be abandoned because it spreads the pain of deficit
cutting over both the tax and spending sides of the budget
and it has an escape clause in the event of an economic
downturn. Yet, the diffusion of some pain to the tax side of
the budget is countered to some degree because large exemp-
tions focus the pain on only a portion of total spending.
The goal of the cuts in the president’s plan is to lower the
five-year average deficit to 2.8 percent of GDP. The deficit
is highly volatile, affected by numerous random variables
other than overall economic activity. It could soar and force
very large cuts even in the absence of an economic down-
turn. By focusing on spending levels, HBR has a much less
volatile and therefore more predictable target. Neverthe-
less, spending levels are also affected by cyclical factors to
some degree.
It is very challenging to design an automatic mecha-
nism that can survive a bit of bad luck. It may be wise to
place limits on the pain imposed by a sequester. An auto-
matic mechanism is more likely to survive if automatic
cuts are not allowed to exceed some absolute amount, such
as 1 percent of GDP.
The Budget Control Act
The debate over the debt limit was a low point in the his-
tory of U.S. budgeting. There were many starts and stops
with aborted deals and much posturing. It was impossible
to predict from day to day where the debate would go, and
at times, the unthinkable—a default on U.S. sovereign
debt—seemed quite possible. House Speaker Boehner held
fast to a goal of reducing the deficit dollar for dollar for any
increase in the debt limit. (It was never clear over what
period the deficit cut was supposed to occur.) For most of
the negotiations, the Speaker insisted that the entire deficit
reduction come from spending cuts, although for a brief
period he and the president were discussing a very large
deficit-reduction package that would have included some
tax increases. Meanwhile, the president wanted a big enough
increase in the debt limit that the issue would not have to
be revisited before the next presidential election.
In the end, Congress and the president agreed to the
Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA), which has two parts.
The first imposes caps on discretionary appropriations
through 2021 that save a cumulative $756 billion starting in
201215 and makes changes in student loans and Pell grants
that save a cumulative $5 billion over the same 10 years. For
2012 and 2013, the BCA has separate caps on appropria-
tions for security and non-security spending. After 2013,
a single cap will apply to total discretionary appropria-
tions. The discretionary caps in the BCA are somewhat
more lenient than the caps in the HBR. The BCA’s discre-
tionary caps and education reforms will result in addi-
tional interest savings of $134 billion.16 In total, the first
part of the BCA will reduce the cumulative deficit by
$895 billion from 2012 through 2021.
The second part of the BCA created a Congressional Joint
Select Committee on Deficit Reduction, dubbed the super
committee, which consisted of 12 members: 3 Republicans
and 3 Democrats from each of the House and Senate. The
committee was instructed to reduce the deficit by a cumu-
lative $1.5 trillion from 2012 through 2021. In the end, it
could not agree to any deficit reductions at all. Accord-
ing to the BCA, the super committee’s failure implies that
there will be an automatic, across-the-board cut in budget
authority17 of $1.2 trillion over 10 years starting in January
2013. Half the cut is to come from defense budget authority
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Members of the electorate spoke loudly in November 2010, when their votes added 63
Republicans to the House of Representatives, resulting in a historical change in its
party composition. A major concern of voters was the ballooning federal debt, which
the Congressional Budget Office projected would grow in the long run at an increas-
ing rate (Congressional Budget Office 2011b). Health programs and, to a lesser
extent, Social Security lie at the root of the long-term problem. Their costs are
approaching 50 percent of noninterest federal spending, and both will continue to
grow faster than tax revenues and the economy.
The president’s budget for fiscal year 2012 issued in February 2011 did not attack the
main sources of spending growth or propose sufficient tax increases to finance such
growth. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), his budget implied rising
deficits relative to GDP after 2015 and a national debt that increases from 62.1 percent
of GDP in 2010 to 87.4 percent in 2021 (CBO 2011a).
A number of private groups were more concerned about the budget situation, con-
cluding that current fiscal policies were not sustainable. They put forward several dif-
ferent policy options that would put the budget on a healthier path. An early effort,
sponsored by the National Academies of Science and Public Administration and co-
chaired by the authors of this report, described four packages that ranged from one in
which fiscal sustainability was achieved entirely by cutting spending to one that relied
entirely on tax increases, with two intermediate packages relying on different mixes of
tax increases and spending cuts (National Research Council and National Academy of
Public Administration 2010). A Bipartisan Policy Center Deficit Reduction Task Force
(DRTF) put forward a detailed plan that was evenly balanced between tax increases and
spending cuts (Domenici and Rivlin 2010). The Peter G. Peterson Foundation spon-
sored six think tanks, including the Bipartisan Policy Center, to develop plans to restore
fiscal stability that spanned the ideological spectrum (Peter J. Peterson Foundation 2011).
However, plans from private sources seldom get the same attention as those with
official backing. In early 2010, the president appointed his own National Commission
on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform. Its report, “The Moment of Truth,” was issued
in December 2010 (Palmer and Penner 2011). The plan cut about $4 trillion from the
projected cumulative deficit through 2021. Not counting interest savings, cuts in spend-
ing accounted for about 70 percent of the deficit reduction, while revenue increases
1
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and half from nondefense budget authority. However,
Social Security and a number of programs focused on poor
people are exempted from the cut. The cut to Medicare is
capped at 2 percent and limited to provider reimbursement.
CBO has provided approximations of the cuts in appro-
priations and in mandatory programs that will occur if the
sequester goes through. These are approximations because
CBO will not administer the automatic cuts. That will be
done by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and
in some areas the automatic cuts could be administered
several different ways. Note that automatic cuts are applied
to budget authority, not to outlays. Outlay cuts will be less
severe because outlays tend to lag budget authority.
The automatic cut in appropriations for defense discre-
tionary spending would be 10 percent in 2013 and then
gradually fall to 8.5 percent by 2021. The cumulative reduc-
tion over 10 years is $492 billion. The cuts in nondefense
discretionary spending and in the non-exempted, non-
defense mandatory programs would be 7.8 percent in 2013,
falling to 5.5 percent in 2021. The total reduction in budget
authority is $492 billion, identical to that in the defense
budget. The 2 percent cut in Medicare saves $123 billion of
this amount. Indirect debt service savings amount to
$169 billion. In total, the automatic cut in budget authority
leads to outlay savings of $1.1 trillion cumulatively. The cut
in outlays is less than the required $1.2 trillion cut in budget
authority because of the aforementioned time lags.18
Since the failure of the super committee, a number of
Republicans and Democrats have argued that the across-the-
board cuts that are now supposed to occur in the defense
budget would dangerously weaken the nation. Senator John
McCain has introduced legislation that would suspend those
cuts. It is hard to believe that the defense cuts could be sus-
pended without doing the same for the nondefense budget.
The president has responded that the cuts must be
implemented and has vowed to veto any legislation that
would suspend them. He hopes that this threat will force
Congress to return to the bargaining table and to agree to
something more sensible than across-the-board cuts.
Although it is hard to find anything to be encouraged
about after the super committee’s abysmal failure, there is
a very slight chance that a return to the bargaining table
could yield some success. The most important positive
development during the committee’s deliberations was an
offer by the Republicans to open the door a tiny crack to
tax increases. It was particularly significant that the vehe-
mently anti-tax committee member Senator Pat Toomey
put the offer on the table. He joins Republican Senators
Crapo and Coburn and then-Senator Gregg who endorsed
tax increases as members of the president’s fiscal commis-
sion. The expiration of the Bush tax cuts at the end of
2012 creates another reason to bargain productively. If the
adamant Republican opposition to tax increases contin-
ues to weaken and Democrats can be persuaded to accept
meaningful reforms in Social Security, Medicare, and Med-
icaid, there is some hope of a balanced solution for Amer-
ica’s fiscal woes in the near term. However, the hope is a slim
one. The two parties are still very far apart, and it will require
much compromising to reach a viable solution.
If negotiations are resumed, it becomes relevant that in
responding to the BCA the president urged the super com-
mittee to “go big” and exceed the goal of deficit savings of
$1.5 trillion over 10 years. The plan he provided the com-
mittee is generally consistent with his earlier framework
and would probably serve as his initial bargaining posi-
tion in any further negotiations. Obama claimed his plan
would save $4.4 trillion, but unfortunately that total included
savings from ending the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, thus
reducing the credibility of his proposal. The CRFB estimates
Obama’s plan would save $1.9 trillion, not counting the
$900 billion saved by the spending caps already put in place
by the BCA. Although the president’s plan would save some-
what more than the super committee’s goal of $1.5 trillion,
it falls short of stabilizing the debt-GDP ratio. CRFB esti-
mates that the ratio would be 74 percent in 2021 under the
president’s plan compared with the 66 percent achieved by
the HBC and the president’s fiscal commission. This ratio
was 62 percent at the end of 2010.
The president’s new plan yields roughly the same mag-
nitude of deficit saving as his framework described earlier,
although some saving is used to pay for a newly designed
jobs initiative. (That initiative will not be discussed here,
because the spending portions of the initiative are modest
and short term.) But the new plan is much more detailed
(except with respect to Social Security, about which it is
silent). For example, there are very specific recommenda-
tions for reducing payments to providers and subsidies to
medical schools under Medicare. Considerable amounts are
saved for Medicare Part D by having drug companies pro-
vide rebates similar to those in the Medicaid program. Newly
enrolled Part B recipients would face higher deductibles,
and the more affluent would pay higher Part B and D pre-
miums. Over three years starting in 2013, civil servants are
expected to contribute an extra 1.2 percent of wages to
their defined benefit retirement plans, and military per-
sonnel and retirees and their dependents are expected to
pay a higher cost share for their health plan. Numerous
increases in fees and insurance premiums are proposed as
are sales of government properties. It is impossible to con-
vey the richness of the plan’s details in a short discussion;
for that, the reader is referred to the official document
describing the plan (OMB 2011).
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The new plan accepts the caps on discretionary spend-
ing stipulated by the BCA and counts the associated
spending cuts toward its saving target. The president
repeats the call for radical tax reform that appeared in
his earlier framework, but recognizing that tax reform
will take a long time, he advocates $1.5 trillion in rev-
enues by limiting itemized deductions and adopts other
base-broadening initiatives for both individuals and
corporations.
The new presidential plan has a somewhat different
enforcement mechanism than the framework. The latter
focused on sequesters that would hit a deficit goal. In 
the new plan, enforcement is centered around goals for
the debt-GDP ratio. To set goals, the baseline debt-GDP
ratio is estimated for 2013 and then reduced 0.2 per-
centage points a year. If Congress does not adopt policy
changes that achieve the goals for the debt-GDP ratio, a
sequester of spending modeled on the one designed by
the BCA goes into effect. An equal amount is obtained from
the revenue side by a proportional reduction in itemized
deductions and exclusions for couples with more than
$250,000 in income and singles with more than $200,000.
The total amount of the required adjustment is limited,
whether it is achieved by deliberate policy actions or
automatically. As noted in our earlier discussion of the
automatic mechanism contained in the framework, such
a limit is useful because it reduces the likelihood Con-
gress will abandon the enforcement process altogether.
The enforcement process is temporarily suspended in
times of economic weakness.
As noted previously, the CRFB has estimated that 
the specific program proposals in the president’s plan
would increase the debt-GDP ratio to over 70 percent by
2021. In contrast, the above enforcement mechanism
requires a continual reduction in the debt-GDP ratio.
Thus, Congress would have to pass spending cuts and/or
tax increases that go considerably beyond those in the
president’s plan.
The BCA’s Bias against 
Discretionary Spending
As a result of its spending caps and the design of the
sequester, the BCA focuses on reducing the deficit by
constraining discretionary spending when discretionary
spending has not played an important role in causing the
long-run budget problems. While discretionary spending
has recently been bloated by the stimulus program, the
caps and the sequester imposed by the BCA would far
more than make up for this bloat. It is very likely that if all
the rules are followed, nondefense discretionary spending
would fall below 3 percent of GDP—the lowest level since
World War II.
Given that Social Security and health spending are
responsible for essentially all the long-run spending prob-
lem, it is ironic that the BCA totally exempts Social Secu-
rity and Medicaid from the sequester and limits the cut in
Medicare to 2 percent. The act formalizes a phenomenon
that has been under way for years. The automatic growth
in health and Social Security is squeezing out all other
functions of government.
Conclusion
It is an understatement to say that this has been a dis-
couraging year for anyone hoping for a more responsi-
ble fiscal policy. The chaos surrounding the debate over 
the debt limit in midsummer and the total failure of the
super committee that emerged from that chaos show that
the country’s fiscal policy-making machinery is terribly
broken. That is not to say there has been zero progress. The
cumulative saving of almost $900 billion associated with
the discretionary spending caps imposed by the BCA is a
significant sum. If $1.2 trillion is added either by a
sequester or a more rational deficit reduction plan, the
total deficit reduction of $2.1 trillion gets the nation about
halfway to the roughly $4 trillion deficit reduction gener-
ally associated with stabilizing the debt-GDP ratio in the
long run.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to be confident that $2.1
trillion in deficit reduction will actually materialize. It is
spread over 10 years and a number of different Congresses.
Any rules imposed by one Congress can be broken by
another. Indeed, past Congresses have not been shy about
breaking their own rules.
Because the nation will make some progress against
the deficit if the rules of the BCA are followed, and
because Republicans are showing some signs of weaken-
ing their total opposition to tax increases, the future is
not totally bleak. Negotiations that build on the deficit
reductions imposed by the BCA could be productive.
But a huge ideological gap remains between the two
political parties, and progress will be elusive unless both
sides show more willingness to get things done for the
good of the country. Without more progress, the nation
will continue its march toward a sovereign debt crisis of
Greek proportions. No one can predict when that might
occur, but the risks are enormous, and it is time our
leaders begin to lower them.
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Notes
1. Rep. Paul Ryan, The Path to Prosperity: Restoring Amer-
ica’s Fiscal Promise, Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Resolution,
House Committee on the Budget, 2011.
2. The White House, “Fact Sheet: The President’s Frame-
work for Shared Prosperity and Shared Fiscal Respon-
sibility,” press release, April 13, 2011.
3. The 10-year deficit savings estimate for the HBR plan
is from CRFB (2011a), and its estimated annual impact
by midcentury is from CBO (2011c), table 2. The
$320 billion in 10-year savings is the OMB estimate for
health care in the president’s plan; the authors have
estimated the midcentury annual impact of the same
on a basis consistent with the methodology used in
CBO (2011c), table 2.
4. Problems of adverse selection would be addressed by
cost-neutral (in the aggregate) risk subsidies and tax
levies applied by the Department of Health and Human
Services to the private insurance plans based on the
characteristics of their actual enrollees.
5. The White House, “President’s Framework,” April 13,
2011.
6. For example, CBO estimates that by 2030 the out-
of-pocket share of health care spending for a typical
Medicare beneficiary would be 68 percent under the
HBR, as opposed to 25 to 30 percent under current law
(CBO 2011c, figure 1).
7. For a brief discussion of how the HBR might be
improved upon written by an advocate of converting
Medicare to premium support, see Wilensky (2011).
For a brief criticism of the various versions of pre-
mium support currently in vogue by one of its initial
proponents, see Aaron (2011).
8. See the “Statement of Actuarial Opinion” by Richard
Foster in Board of Trustees (2011). Both this statement
and the body of the report note that the long-term via-
bility of these strictures would require fundamental
changes in the health care delivery system.
9. SCHIP provides health insurance coverage to un-
insured children living in families with low incomes
that have too much income to qualify for Medicaid.
As in Medicaid, the federal government matches state
spending in accordance with a formula. Unlike Med-
icaid, annual federal funding is set at a fixed level, and
each state receives an allotment based on an estimate
of the target population and the cost of providing
medical services there.
10. For a general discussion of a federal block grant for
Medicaid, see Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and
the Uninsured (2011).
11. The trustees had expected several years of near-term
annual cash flow surpluses for the program, but they
now expect continuous cash flow deficits because of
a downward revision in projected economic growth.
Several other factors, including an increase in
assumed life expectancy, have worsened the long-
term outlook.
12. Annual cash flow deficits are now projected to grow to
1.38 percent of GDP by the time program reserves are
depleted in 2036 and exceed 1.45 percent of GDP by
the end of the 75-year period (Board of Trustees, Fed-
eral Old Age and Survivors Insurance and Federal Dis-
ability Insurance Trust Funds 2011).
13. White House, “President’s Framework,” April 13, 2011.
14. The CRFB estimate of 18 percent is based on slightly
different assumptions than the 19 percent long-run
cap implied by the HBR, but the difference is very
small (CRFB 2011b).
15. Caps can be increased for war spending, disaster
relief, other emergencies, and monies spent to reduce
improper benefit payments in several programs pro-
viding transfer payments. The law also requires that
the Congress vote on a balanced budget amendment
to the Constitution.
16. The estimate of interest saving is based on CBO’s inter-
est forecast of August 2011 and therefore differs from
the March 2011 baseline assumptions used in the first
part of this paper. See CBO (2011b).
17. For discretionary programs, budget authority is pro-
vided by appropriations that are most often passed
annually. For entitlements, budget authority is often
created by dedicated revenues, such as the payroll tax
that finances Part A Medicare.
18. Proportionate cuts are applied equally to every
defense and nondefense budget account in 2013. The
percentage cut is somewhat larger in defense than in
nondefense accounts. After 2013, cuts are not equal-
ized at the account level for discretionary spending.
Separate overall caps are established for defense and
nondefense budget authority.
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